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"My keenest interest is excited, not by what are called great questions and
great cases, but by little decisions which the common run of selectors would pass
by because they did not deal with the Constitution or a telephone company, yet
which have in them the germ of some wider theory, and therefore of some pro-
found interstitial change in the very tissue of the law:'-OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLEcTED LEGL PAPFRs (1920) 269.
Recent Cases
CRIMINAL LAw-STATUTORY CRIME-INTENT REQUESTM
Morissette v. United States'
While hunting deer on government land the defendant picked up, and later
sold, some United States practice bomb casings which had been piled in a heap and
were rusting away. He testified that he thought the casings were abandoned. At
the trial the judge instructed the jury that if Morissette intended to take the
property, this was all the intent required. The court of appeals2 affirmed a con-
1. 342 U.S. 246, 72 Sup. Ct. 240 (1952).
2. 187 F. 2d 427 (6th Cir. 1951).
(452)
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viction of a violation of the United States Code,3 and ruled that this particular
offense required no element of criminal intent. The Supreme Court, in reversing
the conviction by an unanimous decision (8-0), attributed to Congress, in drafting
this statute, the purpose of consolidating and simplifying the law of larceny with-
out, however, departing from the common law tradition that these are crimes of
intendment.
Historically, mens rea has been essential to crimes, and at one time was
required for virtually all offenses.r However, the impossibility of proving the intent
of the wrongdoer and the necessity, from a social viewpoint, for more convictions
led to movements, both here" and in England,7 that begat a class of cases where
intent was not required. This new category of cases, commonly called "public wel-
fare offenses," s quickly gained favor with the courts and legislatures of America
and has been continually expanding to include new types of cases.0 Fear that the
constant multiplication of the new crimes might wholly eliminate the element of
3. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1948): "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or know-
ingly converts to his use or the use of another.., any.., thing of value of the
United States ... [s] shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more
than ten years, or both."
4. BL. COMM. '21; Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HA.v. L. REv. 974 (1932); Levitt,
Tke Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 ILL. L. Ray. 117 (1922). Exceptions
were certain sex crimes which do not effect this discussion. See Commonwealth v.
Welansky, 216 Mass. 383, 55 N.E. 2d 902 (1944).
5. Bisnop, CRIMiNAL LAw § 287 (8th ed. 1892) ("There can be no crime
large or small, without an evil mind."); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L.
REv. 55 (1933) ("But apart from exceptional isolated cases criminal liability depend-
ed upon proof of a criminal intent"); See Rex v. Vantandillo, 4 M. & S. 73, 105 Eng.
Rep. 762 (K.B. 1815) (Defendant was found guilty of carrying baby with small
pox, but the court said one couldn't be found guilty unless she acted "with full
knowledge of the fact.").
6. One of the first of these cases was Barnes v. State, 19 Conn. 398 (1849)
where the defendant was convicted of selling liquor to a drunkard, when he was
absent from the store and had no knowledge that buyer was a drunkard; Ulrich v.
Commonwealth, 69 Ky. 400 (1896) (sale of liquor to a minor); Commonwealth v.
Farren, 9 Allen 489 (Mass. 1864) (sale of adulterated milk); State v. Baltimore and
Susquehanna Steam Co., 13 Md. 181 (1859) (transportation of a slave).
7. Regina v. Woodrow, 15 M. & W. 404, 153 Eng. Rep. 907 (1846), was
probably the start of the trend in England. There a tobacco dealer was convicted of
having in his possession adulterated tobacco. Baron Parks said, "It is very true that
in particular instances it may produce mischief, because an innocent man may suffer
. ..but the public inconvience would be greater, if in every case the officers were
obliged to prove knowledge." Queen v. Stephens, L.R. 1 Q.B. 702 (1866) (casting
rubbish in a river); Hobbs v. Winchester Corp., [1910] 2 K.B. 471 (sale of un-
sound meat).
8. This phrase was probably coined by Francis Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses,
33 COL. L. Rav. 55 (1933).
9. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COL. L. REy. 55 (1933) cites and classi-
fies a large number of such cases as falling into the following groups; (1) illegal
sales of intoxicating liquor, (2) sales of impure or adulterated food or drugs, (3)
sales of misbranded articles, (4) violations of anti-narcotics acts, (5) criminal
nuisances, (6) violations of traffic regulations,- (7) violations of motor-vehicle laws,
and (8) violations of general police regulations, passed for the safety, health, or well-
being of the community.
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MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
intent has moved some students of the law to make many, and perhaps, sound
objections.10
The unanswered question is: When the statute is silent, what rules or guides
can be followed to distinguish between those crimes which require intent and those
which do not? The present case is an important step toward the solution of that
problem. The Supreme Court's opinion applied two set of guides in reaching its
decision as to whether or not this was a public welfare offense. The first set con-
sists of those guides which must be rigidly followed. They are: (1) that to con-
stitute a public welfare crime, whatever the intent of the violator, the injury to the
public must be the same;- (2) with a few exceptions,'" for such violations the
penalty must be small;' 8 and (3) when the statute is silent concerning intent, it can
be classified as a non-intent crime only if the common law has not placed a con-
trary meaning on it.14 The second set of guides consists of signposts which do not
necessarily form a part of every public welfare offense, but are often indicative of
them. They are: (1) that many of these offenses do not involve affirmative acts
but are in the nature of neglect or inaction where the law imposes a duty to act;",
(2) that many such violations result in no direct injury, but merely create the
danger or probability of it which the law seeks to minimize;10 (3) that such of-
fenses are against the authority of the state in that they impair the efficiency of
controls deemed essential to the social order;' 7 and (4) that the accused is usually
10. Felton v. United States, 96 U.S. 699, 24 L.Ed. 875 (1877); Hall Pro-
legoena to a Science of Crimina.Law, 89 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 549 (1941); Stally-
brass, The Eclipse of Meis Rea, 52 L. Q. REv. 60 (1936); Radin, Intent, Crininal,
8 ENc. Soc. Sci. 126 (1932); For citations to other articles on this subject see
CLARK & MARSHALL, CRIUMES § 42, n. 35 (5th ed. 1952).
11. For examples see United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943);
Commonwealth v. New York Cent., 202 Mass. 394, 88 N.E. 764 (1909) (where
defendant tried to move train from obstructing the road to comply with an or-
dinance but could not since the air brakes had been tampered with by strangers);
Laird v. Dobell, [1906] 1 K.B. 131; Rex v. Larsonneur, 97 J.P. 206, 24 Cr. App. 74
(1933) (where defendant was convicted of illegally entering the country when she
was brought there under police custody).
12. These exceptions are, for the most part, certain sex crimes such as rape
and bigamy.
13. See People ex rel. Price v. Sheffield Farms-Slawson-Decker Co., 225 N. Y.
25, 121 N.E. 474 (1918); Tenement House Department v. McDevit, 215 N. Y.
160, 109 N.E. 88 (1915).
14. Cf. KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW § 31 (1952); MILLER, CRIMINAL
LAW § 20 (a) (1934); Examples of where the common law definition was applied
are, State v. DeWolfe, 67 Neb. 321, 93 N.W. 746 (1903) (nuisance was ascribed
the meaning it had at common law); Prindle v. State, 31 Tex. Cr. Rep. 551, 21
S.W. 360 (1893); Mitchell v. State, 42 Ohio St. 383 (1884).
15. For examples see Hays v. Schueler, 107 Kan. 635, 193 Pac. 311 (1920)
(failure to carry a rear red light on a motor car); People v. Shoepflin, 78 Misc.
62 (N. Y. County Court 1912) (driving an automobile with a distinctive number);
City of Emporia v. Becker, 76 Kan. 181, 90 Pac. 798 (1907) (liability of employee
who is ignorant that his employer has failed to pay a license tax).
16. For examples see Commonwealth v. Savery, 145 Mass. 212, 13 N.E. 611
(1887) (keeping liquor for sale); Commonwealth v. Goodman, 97 Mass. 117 (1867).
17. Examples are, American Car and Foundry Co. v. Armentraut, 214 IlL
509, 73 N.E. 766 (1905) (employment of child under statutory age); State v. Welch,
21 Minn. 22 (1874) (double voting).
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in a position to prevent the violation by no more care than society expects from a
person who assumed his responsibility.18 It should be evident that the above dis-
cussion is not the definition of a crime, but can only act as a guide to the correct
solution of the case.
A second ground for the decision of the court was the interpretation of the
requirement that the defendant "knowingly convert"' 9 the property. It was urged
by the government that, while the stated offenses of embezzlement, stealing and
purloining are crimes requiring criminal intent, the Congress joined with these of-
fenses a new and different crime, knowingly to convert government property, where
no criminal intent was necessary. In discarding this contention the court pointed
out the pains to which Congress had gone to differentiate between ordinary, unwit-
ting acts which can constitute a conversion and make a defendant liable for a civil
tort, and acts necessary to a "knowing conversion." For civil liability, good faith,
mistake, motive, intent, and knowledge are generally irrelevant. But for criminal
liability, to knowingly convert, one must be in possession of facts under which he
is aware that he cannot lawfully do an act, but nevertheless proceeds to do it.20
"He must have knowledge of the facts ... that makes the taking a conversion." 2'
The court concluded that a person can not knowingly convert property that he did
not know could be converted, as would have been the case if he truly believed it to
be abandoned property. It is fortunate for the development of the law that the
court saw fit not to base its decision solely upon this more simple ground.
THOMAs G. STRoNG
18. For examples see United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280, 66 L.Ed. 619,
42 Sup. Ct. 303 (1921) (sale of narcotics by a doctor to a dope addict); State v.
Sharp, 121 Minn. 381, 141 N.W. 526 (1913) ("Such statutes are in the nature of
police regulations ... ; the object being to require a degree of the public which
shall render violation impossible.").
19. United States v. Hughes, 278 Fed. 262 (E.D. Pa. 1922) (statute made
punishable persons who "knowingly circulate ... any written or printed matter
teaching the overthrow by force or violence of the government of the United
States or of all forms of law."); For an interpretation of "knowingly" see Perkins,
Ratioate of Mens Rea, 52 HiAv. L. REv. 905 (1939).
20. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAw § 20 (e) (1934).
21. Morrissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 271 (1952).
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